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SANDHOLM V. KUECKER: THE ILLINOIS SUPREME
COURT “SLAPPS” AWAY A PROTECTION OF
ILLINOIS CITIZENS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
On January 20, 2012, the Illinois Supreme Court decided Sandholm
v. Kuecker1 and effectively nullified the Illinois Citizen Participation
Act (CPA).2  The CPA is Illinois’s anti-“strategic lawsuit against pub-
lic participation” (SLAPP) statute, and like other states’ anti-SLAPP
statutes, it provides a procedural mechanism to dispose of retaliatory,
meritless claims and quickly shift the defendant’s legal costs to the
filer.3
Anti-SLAPP statutes seek to protect citizens’ First Amendment
rights to petition, speech, association, and governmental participation
against those who attempt to limit those rights through litigation tac-
tics.4  The Illinois legislature drafted the CPA to address the “abuse of
the judicial process . . . [that] has been used as a means of intimidat-
ing, harassing, or punishing citizens and organizations for involving
themselves in public affairs.”5  The United States has long “treasured”
these rights;6 the “alleged chilling effect on citizen involvement with
government . . . is the great evil of the SLAPP.”7
This Note argues that the Illinois Supreme Court, in Sandholm,
abused its judicial discretion by construing Illinois’s Anti-SLAPP stat-
ute so narrowly that it effectively amended the statute to provide lit-
1. Sandholm v. Kuecker, 962 N.E.2d 418 (Ill. 2012).
2. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/1–99 (2012).
3. See id. §§ 5, 20.  The CPA states:
On the filing of any motion as described in Section 15, a hearing and decision on the
motion must occur within 90 days after notice of the motion is given to the respondent.
An appellate court shall expedite any appeal or other writ, whether interlocutory or
not, from a trial court order denying that motion or from a trial court’s failure to rule
on that motion within 90 days after that trial court order or failure to rule.
Id. § 20(a).  The CPA further provides instructions for awarding attorney’s fees and costs: “The
court shall award a moving party who prevails in a motion under this Act reasonable attorney’s
fees and costs incurred in connection with the motion.” Id. § 25.
4. Id. § 15.
5. Id. § 5.
6. Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
7. Mark J. Sobczak, Comment, SLAPPed in Illinois: The Scope and Applicability of the Illi-
nois Citizen Participation Act, 28 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 559, 564 (2008).
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tle, if any, protection for victims of SLAPP suits.8  The plain language
of the CPA provides a special motion to dismiss that disposes of merit-
less litigation brought against defendants when the suit “is based on,
relates to, or is in response to any act or acts of the moving party in
furtherance of the moving party’s rights of petition, speech, associa-
tion, or to otherwise participate in government.”9  Despite the legisla-
ture’s instruction to construe the Act liberally,10 the Sandholm court
set new precedent, under which the statute’s special motion to dismiss
applies only to those claims “solely based on, relating to, or in re-
sponse to” the defendant’s acts.11  The addition of the word “solely”
will enable nearly any plaintiff to overcome the CPA’s special motion
to dismiss, amounting to a much weaker standard than intended by
the legislature.  Lower courts throughout Illinois have already imple-
mented the Sandholm standard, and even though those suits would
have traditionally been dismissed under the CPA, courts have since
granted zero special motions, leaving those defendants without a rem-
edy and the legislature with a flagrant problem.12
Prior to the Sandholm decision, critics of the CPA warned that the
statute’s broad scope would result in a chilling effect on potential
plaintiffs who might have legitimate claims, but choose not to file be-
cause of a probable dismissal under the CPA.13  It is impossible to
know whether such a result materialized because suits that are never
filed cannot be quantified; however, the Illinois legislature presuma-
bly considered that tension because the statute’s express purpose is to
“strike a balance between the rights of persons to file lawsuits for in-
jury and the constitutional rights of persons to petition.”14  The
8. In Ryan v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., a case that followed the Sandholm decision, the
court stated:
The trouble with the [CPA] as written, however, is that if it is applied to the letter
then the Act would mandate dismissal of every lawsuit that implicated a defendant’s
first amendment activities regardless of whether the plaintiff’s claims were meritorious
or not, essentially creating absolute immunity for torts committed while exercising first
amendment rights.
Ryan v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 979 N.E.2d 954, 961 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).  The Sandholm
holding gives lower courts the room to criticize the statute as written, even though it is not their
judicial role to do so.
9. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/15.
10. Id. § 30.
11. Sandholm v. Kuecker, 962 N.E.2d 418, 434 (Ill. 2012) (emphasis added).
12. See Cartwright v. Cooney, No. 10-cv-1691, 2012 WL 1021816 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2012); Chi.
Reg’l Council of Carpenters v. Jursich, 986 N.E.2d 197 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013); August v. Hanlon,
975 N.E.2d 1234 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012); Ryan v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 979 N.E.2d 954 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2012).
13. Sobczak, supra note 7, at 574.
14. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/5 (emphasis added).
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Sandholm court overstepped its authority by recalibrating the balance
struck by the legislature and shifting deference in favor of plaintiffs.
The court’s construction of the CPA under Sandholm no longer pro-
tects citizens’ rights to petition without the fear of judicial retaliation.
Now, any party may use a suit or the special motion as a weapon to
prolong litigation and chill oppositional public speech.  A plaintiff
may sue a defendant for whatever meritless claims it may conceive
and easily survive the CPA’s special motion to dismiss.  Alternatively,
if a defendant is sued for her speech, she may prolong litigation by
employing this extra motion, despite her knowledge that it will not
succeed because her aim is to cause the other party additional legal
fees.15
Part II of this Note discusses the SLAPP suit phenomena and ana-
lyzes California’s, Massachusetts’s, and Illinois’s anti-SLAPP statutes
and each state’s relevant caselaw.16  Part II concludes by introducing
“sham” litigation, as considered by the Illinois legislature and dis-
cussed by the appellate court decision in Sandholm.17  Part III details
the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Sandholm.18  Part IV exam-
ines the deficiently broad language of Illinois’s CPA statute, compar-
ing it to that in the California and Massachusetts statutes and
discussing how their statutes’ specificity has enabled those states to
achieve their particular policy aims.  Part IV also expounds how the
Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Sandholm constituted inappropri-
ate judicial activism, which should awaken the legislature to the possi-
bility of amending the CPA to preserve the statute’s intended effect.
Part V recommends that the Illinois legislature add a factual analysis
that includes a “genuineness” inquiry of both sham suits and sham
anti-SLAPP motions, which could counteract the abuse that will likely
be caused by the Sandholm decision.
II. BACKGROUND
The phrase “strategic lawsuit against public participation” was
coined by University of Colorado professors George W. Pring and Pe-
nelope Canan to describe “legally meritless suits designed, from their
15. Cf. Joshua L. Baker, Chapter 338: Another New Law, Another SLAPP in the Face of Cali-
fornia Business, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 409, 412-14 (2004) (summarizing California’s anti-
SLAPP statute, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2004)).
16. See infra notes 18–103 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 97–103 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 104–116 and accompanying text.
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inception, to intimidate and harass political critics into silence.”19
Pring characterized SLAPP suits by four criteria: “(1) a civil complaint
or counterclaim (for monetary damages and/or injunction), (2) filed
against non-governmental individuals and/or groups, (3) because of
their communications to a governmental body, official, or the electo-
rate, (4) on an issue of some public interest or concern.”20  Essentially,
a SLAPP is any type of lawsuit that is filed in order to “chill” the
speech or petitioning activity of an individual and, as a byproduct, the
community.21  The plaintiff’s true motive in filing this type of suit is
retaliatory; she adopts some pretense for seeking redress upon which
she may prolong litigation and, in so doing, punishes the defendant for
speaking out unfavorably against her by causing the defendant to in-
cur costly legal fees.22  SLAPPs have been called a “distortion of the
American process of open government”23 because “[i]nstitutions such
as free press and a reasonably neutral government do not work if peo-
ple are afraid to use them.”24
A. The California and Massachusetts Statutes and Caselaw
Twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia currently have an
anti-SLAPP statute or doctrine.25  Each state mechanism attempts to
address the SLAPP problem in similar ways, often through stays of
19. Edmond Costantini & Mary Paul Nash, SLAPP/SLAPPback: The Misuse of Libel Law
for Political Purposes and a Countersuit Response, 7 J.L. & POL. 417, 423 (1991); see also
Sandholm v. Kuecker, 962 N.E.2d 418, 427 (Ill. 2012).
20. George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 7–8 (1989).
21. See id. at 4–8; see also Sobczak, supra note 7, at 565 (discussing the “ripple effect [that] a
SLAPP produces in a given community” and noting that “[e]ven the hardiest of community
activists can be deterred from voicing their opinions when they witness their neighbors face
lawsuits for similar actions”).  The CPA was designed to address situations like those in which
“citizens oppose a developer’s plan and petition their local government to stop the developer in
some way.”  Sandholm v. Kuecker, 942 N.E.2d 544, 550 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).  Then, when “[t]he
developer . . . sues the citizens for intentional interference with prospective business,” the CPA
would guide the court to “throw[ ] out” the lawsuit and shift costs to the developer to remedy
the financial strain it caused the citizen. Id.
22. See Sobczak, supra note 7, at 561 & n.9; see also United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lock-
heed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 970–71 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The hallmark of a SLAPP suit
is that it lacks merit, and is brought with the goals of obtaining an economic advantage over a
citizen party by increasing the cost of litigation to the point that the citizen party’s case will be
weakened or abandoned, and of deterring future litigation.”).
23. Sobczak, supra note 7, at 565.
24. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Jerome I. Braun, Increasing SLAPP Protection: Un-
burdening the Right of Petition in California, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965, 971–72 (1999)).
25. See State Anti-SLAPP Laws, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, http://www.anti-slapp.org/
your-states-free-speech-protection (last visited Mar. 30, 2014); see also Jacquelyn Kline, Anti-
SLAPP Statutes in the US by State, LEGAL PROJECT (Jan. 14, 2009), http://www.legal-project.org/
149/anti-slapp-statutes-in-the-us-by-state.
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discovery, fee-shifting provisions, and expedited judicial processes,
but the statutes vary radically in their scope.26  This Note analyzes
California’s and Massachusetts’s anti-SLAPP statutes and each state’s
relevant caselaw, which have been the subjects of comparison in Illi-
nois jurisprudence.
1. California’s Experience
California’s anti-SLAPP statute is widely considered to be one of
the broadest and, as such, provides a useful comparison for those who
criticized Illinois’s statute for its unjust breadth.27  It provides a de-
tailed, yet expansive and nonexclusive28 list of protected petitioning
activities:
(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legisla-
tive, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceed-
ing authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing
made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by
a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official pro-
ceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writ-
ing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in
connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct
in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition
or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public
issue or an issue of public interest.29
The statute requires a judge to analyze the merits of the defendant’s
petitioning activity and the plaintiff’s suit through a two-pronged pro-
cedure.  First, the defendant must establish that its conduct fits within
the category of “petitioning activity” and that the cause of action
“arises from” that conduct.30  Petitioning activity and suits arising
from it are construed broadly—even when a cause of action arises
from both protected and unprotected activity, the suit is subject to the
anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss.31  If the defendant satisfies its
26. Sobczak, supra note 7, at 576.
27. See Braun, supra note 24, at 1040; see also Kathryn W. Tate, California’s Anti-SLAPP
Legislation: A Summary of and Commentary on Its Operation and Scope, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
801, 858–59 (2000); London Wright-Pegs, Comment, The Media SLAPP Back: An Analysis of
California’s Anti-SLAPP Statute and the Media Defendant, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 323, 334
(2009).
28. Birkner v. Lam, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 196–97 (Ct. App. 2007).
29. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e) (West Supp. 2014).
30. Gerbosi v. Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 73, 80–81 (Ct. App. 2011)
(“A defendant does not establish that a cause of action ‘arises from’ an act in furtherance of the
right of petition or free speech merely by showing that the plaintiff filed his or her lawsuit in
retaliation for the defendant’s petitioning or speech activities.  The defendant must establish that
the plaintiff’s cause of action is actually based on conduct in exercise of those rights.”).
31. South Sutter, LLC v. LJ Sutter Partners, L.P., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 301, 329 (Ct. App. 2011).
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burden, the court moves on to the second prong of the analysis, which
shifts the burden to the plaintiff to show that it will likely succeed with
the claim if allowed to continue.32
California courts’ extremely broad construction of the statute
prompted a trend in which corporate defendants utilized the special
motion to thwart individuals’ suits against them for their commercial
speech.33  That trend led the California legislature to clarify the stat-
ute’s preamble to include an instruction to courts to construe the stat-
ute broadly, much like Illinois’s current purpose statement.34  Also,
California created additional provisions to specify the scope and appli-
cability of the original anti-SLAPP statute in order to “fix the poten-
tial abuse.”35
In Hecimovich v. Encinal School Parent Teacher Organization, a
volunteer fourth-grade basketball coach filed a defamation claim
against parents who had “rallied” to remove him as coach because
they disagreed with his disciplinary methods.36  As a preliminary mat-
ter, the court established that even truly defamatory speech could be
protected petitioning activity under the anti-SLAPP statute.37  Under-
taking the statute’s standard two-pronged analysis procedure, the
court first determined that the defendants’ activities qualified as peti-
tioning activity because the parents’ concern for children’s safety con-
32. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1).
33. Baker, supra note 15, at 413–14.
34. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a); see Baker, supra note 15, at 413.
35. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16–.18.  “This statute introduced a ‘strict burden of proof
standard’ to help fix the potential abuse of California’s anti-SLAPP law.”  Wright-Pegs, supra
note 27, at 341 n.57.  California also has a third anti-SLAPP provision, chapter 338. CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 425.17.  It addresses the corporate abuse trend previously observed in
Californiaby prohibiting the special motion’s application to commercial speech if three condi-
tions are met:
(1) the target, as the “speaker,” must be a person primarily engaged in the business of
selling or leasing goods or services; (2) the “content” of the commercial speech must
consist of representations of fact about the speaker’s or a competitor’s business opera-
tions, goods, or services; and (3) the “intended audience” of the speech must have been
an actual or potential customer, or at least a person who was likely to repeat the speech
to another actual or potential customer.
Baker, supra note 15, at 418 (footnotes omitted) (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.17(c)).  The
extra provision enables the original anti-SLAPP statute to be applied widely in keeping with its
purpose of “protect[ing] individuals from meritless, harassing lawsuits whose purpose is to chill
protected expression,” without opening it to abuse.  Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d
832, 837 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001).
36. Hecimovich v. Encinal Sch. Parent Teacher Org., 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 455, 459 (Ct. App.
2012).
37. Id. at 466.
2014] SANDHOLM V. KUECKER 1099
stituted an issue of “public interest.”38  Then, the court determined
that the plaintiff could not show a likelihood of prevailing on the mer-
its of his defamation claim.39  Thus, the court granted the defendants’
special motion to dismiss the suit.40
2. Massachusetts’s Experience
The Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute also has a two-pronged anal-
ysis procedure, broad application, and a deferential description of “a
party’s exercise of its right of petition.”41  Massachusetts’s common
law places an initial burden upon the defendant to demonstrate,
through the pleadings and affidavits, that the plaintiff’s claims are
“based on the defendant’s petitioning activities alone and have no
substantial basis other than or in addition to its petitioning activi-
ties.”42  The state’s statute provides the second prong:
The court shall grant such special motion, unless the [plaintiff]
shows that: (1) the [defendant]’s exercise of its right to petition was
devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in
law and (2) the [defendant]’s acts caused actual injury to the
[plaintiff].43
38. Id. at 466–67 (noting that “public interest should be something of concern to a substantial
number of people. . . .  Nevertheless, it may encompass activity between private people.” (quot-
ing Rivera v. First DataBank, Inc., 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 6 (Ct. App. 2010)).
39. Id. at 469–70.  The court noted that “[w]hile plaintiff’s burden may not be ‘high,’ he must
demonstrate that his claim is legally sufficient.” Id. at 470.  The plaintiff’s claim was insufficient
because he did not produce admissible evidence of the essential elements of defamation and
because, even had he produced adequate evidence, the defendant’s statements were protected
under the doctrine of “privileged publication.” Id. at 471–73.
40. Id. at 469, 477.  The court recognized that the “plaintiff needs to show only a ‘minimum
level of legal sufficiency and triability.’” Id. at 470 (quoting Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co., 2 P.3d 27,
33 n.5 (Cal. 2000)).
41. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2010); see also Shannon Hartzler, Note, Protecting
Informed Public Participation: Anti-SLAPP Law and the Media Defendant, 41 VAL. U. L. REV.
1235, 1256–59 (2007).  The statute states:
[T]he words “a party’s exercise of its right of petition” shall mean any written or oral
statement made before or submitted to a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any
other governmental proceeding; any written or oral statement made in connection with
an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or
any other governmental proceeding; any statement reasonably likely to encourage con-
sideration or review of an issue by a legislative, executive, or judicial body or any other
governmental proceeding; any statement reasonably likely to enlist public participation
in an effort to effect such consideration; or any other statement falling within constitu-
tional protection of the right to petition government.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H.
42. Marabello v. Bos. Bark Corp., 974 N.E.2d 636, 640–41 (Mass. 2012) (quoting Duracraft
Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 943 (Mass. 1998)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); accord Fustolo v. Hollander, 920 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Mass. 2010).
43. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H.
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The Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute differs from that of other
states in two significant ways: (1) it applies to petitioning activities
that do not pertain to the public interest and (2) the statute imposes
unique procedural burdens.44
In the landmark decision Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Products
Corp., upon which the Illinois Supreme Court’s Sandholm reasoning is
based,45 the two parties were corporate competitors.46  The plaintiff
corporation, Duracraft, filed suit against Holmes Products and a for-
mer Duracraft executive who had since been hired by Holmes Prod-
ucts.47  Duracraft claimed that the executive disclosed confidential
information in a deposition during the two companies’ adjudicatory
proceedings before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in viola-
tion of a valid nondisclosure agreement.48  The defendants argued that
the deposition testimony was “petitioning activity” protected under
Massachusetts’s anti-SLAPP statute, and that any claim by Duracraft
based on that testimony should be dismissed.49  The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court denied the defendant’s special motion to dis-
miss because the plaintiff had a separate “substantial basis other than
[the executive’s] petitioning activity” upon which it brought suit,
namely the nondisclosure agreement that the executive signed.50
Though the statute’s legislative history demonstrated that it was “in-
tended to enact very broad protection for petitioning activities,”51 the
court found that legislative history unhelpful because it failed to ad-
dress situations in which a court suspects that the special motion is
being “deployed not to limit ‘strategic litigation,’ but as an additional
litigation tactic.”52  Thus, the court focused on the first prong of the
statutory test, whereby the defendant must show that the plaintiff’s
claims were “based on” the defendant’s petitioning activities.53  The
court explained that the statutory test could only yield a just result
when the plaintiff’s claim was “solely based on” the petitioning activ-
ity.  In the court’s opinion, focusing on the defendant’s petitioning
activity—rather than the plaintiff’s claim—would ignore other poten-
44. Rebecca Ariel Hoffberg, Note, The Special Motion Requirements of the Massachusetts
Anti-SLAPP Statute: A Real Slap in the Face for Traditional Civil Practice and Procedure, 16
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 97, 99 (2006).
45. See Sandholm v. Kuecker, 962 N.E.2d 418, 430–31 (Ill. 2012).
46. Duracraft Corp., 691 N.E.2d at 937.
47. Id. at 937–38.
48. Id. at 938.
49. Id. at 939.
50. Id. at 943–44.
51. Id. at 940.
52. Duracraft Corp., 691 N.E.2d at 941 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 942.
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tially legitimate legal claims that were unrelated to the petitioning
activity.54
The court interpreted the statute to apply to claims that are “solely
‘based on’ the petitioning activity” and admitted that some analysis of
the plaintiff’s claims was necessary in order to allow claims that are
not based on the petitioning activity to survive.55  The court’s determi-
nation that the plaintiff had a separate basis (the valid contract) that
was unrelated to the defendant’s petitioning activity (his deposition),
meant that it would not grant the anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss, even
without having considered the second prong.56  The court also pro-
vided an example for future courts: “a defamation claim . . . can be
tested by showing that the defendant’s petitioning activity was devoid
of factual or legal support and thus can overcome a presumption of
qualified immunity.”57
In a subsequent Massachusetts Supreme Court decision, Baker v.
Parsons, the court was forced to expand upon its analysis of parties’
burdens because the defendant in that case, unlike in Duracraft, satis-
fied its burden to prove that the plaintiff’s action was based solely on
its petitioning activities.58  The court identified the lawsuit as one
“based on petitioning activity” because the allegedly defamatory
“smear campaign” was contained in a letter to a government official.59
After the court determined that the defendant satisfied its burden, the
court analyzed whether the plaintiff could prove that the underlying
petition (1) “was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any ar-
guable basis in law” and (2) has “caused actual injury to the [plain-
54. See id.  The court stated, “In this case, however, focusing on the defendants’ petitioning
activity and ignoring Duracraft’s claims—that a contractual obligation precludes [the em-
ployee’s] exercise of otherwise protected petitioning activity—fails to test fully whether
Duracraft’s claim lacks merit.”  Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 942–44.  The court specified that “[t]he Massachusetts statute makes no provision
for the plaintiff to show that its own claims are not frivolous.” Id. at 942.
57. Id. at 942.
58. Baker v. Parsons, 750 N.E.2d 953, 959–60 (Mass. 2001).
59. See id. at 955–56, 960; see also Hoffberg, supra note 44, at 107–10.  The case concerned an
island property owner who applied for licenses to construct a pier on his property. Baker, 750
N.E.2d at 955.  A scientist wrote a letter to public officials expressing concern that the pier
construction would have a detrimental impact on the biodiversity of that habitat, specifically
with regard to the island’s aquatic birds. See id. at 955–56.  The property owner took issue with
the portion of the scientist’s letter that stated, “It is my fervent hope that the state and federal
agencies charged with protecting the region’s natural resources will act to halt the continued
degradation of this important site and restore Clark’s Island to the prominence it held only
recently in providing nesting habitat to aquatic birds.” Id. at 956 (emphasis omitted).  The prop-
erty owner brought defamation claims against the scientist, which were subsequently dismissed
pursuant to the special motion because the nonmovant property owner did not satisfy his burden
of proof. See id. 955–57.
1102 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:1093
tiff].”60  The court referenced Duracraft when interpreting “devoid of
any reasonable factual support” as requiring the plaintiff to show “by
a preponderance of evidence” that the defendant’s petitioning activity
lacked any reasonable factual support, and was essentially “sham” pe-
titioning.61  The court clarified that the special motion presumes a dis-
missal of the plaintiff’s claim because the anti-SLAPP motion must be
granted if the petitioner’s activity had some factual basis.62  Given that
presumption and the high standard, the court granted the special mo-
tion to dismiss.63
B. The Illinois Statute and the Procedural History of
Sandholm v. Kuecker
In August of 2007, Illinois became the twenty-sixth state to enact an
anti-SLAPP statute when it created the CPA.64  The CPA was the re-
sult of five years of work by a handful of Illinois legislators65 who were
determined to pass what they considered to be “‘common-sense’
legislation.”66
The CPA states:
[I]t is declared to be the public policy of the State of Illinois that the
constitutional rights of citizens and organizations to be involved and
participate freely in the process of government must be encouraged
and safeguarded with great diligence. . . .  The laws, courts, and
other agencies of this State must provide the utmost protection for
the free exercise of these rights of petition, speech, association, and
government participation.
. . . .
It is in the public interest and it is the purpose of this Act to strike
a balance between the rights of persons to file lawsuits for injury
and the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, as-
sociate freely, and otherwise participate in government . . . .67
60. Baker, 750 N.E.2d at 960 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2010)).
61. Id. at 961–62; see also Duracraft Corp., 691 N.E.2d at 943.
62. See Baker, 750 N.E.2d at 961; see also Hoffberg, supra note 44, at 110–11 (noting that the
presumption in favor of the special motion is unlike a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, for which
the court presumes a denial).
63. Baker, 750 N.E.2d at 961–62.
64. Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act. No. 95-506, 2007 Ill. Laws 1434 (codified at 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 110/1–99 (2012)); see also Debbie L. Berman & Wade A. Thomson, llinois’
Anti–SLAPP Statute: A Potentially Powerful New Weapon for Media Defendants, COMM. LAW.,
Mar. 2009, at 13, 13.
65. Eric M. Madiar & Terrence J. Sheahan, Illinois’ New Anti–SLAPP Statute, 96 ILL. B.J.
620, 621 (2008).  Senators John Cullerton and Dan Cronin and Representative Sara Feigenholtz,
each sponsored failing bills before Cullerton, Feigenholtz, and Senator Jack Franks successfully
passed the CPA as Senate Bill 1434 in 2007. Id.
66. Sobczak, supra note 7, at 570.
67. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/5.
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The Illinois Supreme Court recognized this public policy foundation
for the statute, in addition to its goals to “establish an efficient process
for identification and adjudication of SLAPPs” and “provide for attor-
ney’s fees and costs to prevailing movants.”68
Commentators consider the CPA to be facially broader than other
states’ anti-SLAPP statutes.  One reason is section 15, which immu-
nizes “any act or acts” made “in furtherance of the constitutional right
to petition, speech, association, and participation in government . . .
regardless of intent or purpose.”69  Also, the CPA defines “govern-
ment,” “person,” and “claim” broadly, in addition to the CPA’s ex-
plicit instruction that it be “construed liberally to effectuate its
purpose and intent fully.”70
The CPA’s plain language mandates a two-pronged analysis that
first requires a defendant show that the plaintiff’s complaint was
“based on” his petitioning activity in furtherance of his constitutional
rights.71  Then, under section 20(c), the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
produce “clear and convincing evidence” demonstrating that the de-
fendant’s acts are not immunized by the CPA.72  In the second prong,
the court examines the genuineness of the defendant’s petitioning to
determine whether it was all a “sham” and “not genuinely aimed at
procuring a favorable government action.”73
1. Wright Development Group LLC v. Walsh
In Wright Development Grp., the Illinois Supreme Court estab-
lished that the CPA could protect defamatory statements made to the
media.74  In that case, a developer sued a condominium association
68. Wright Dev. Grp., LLC v. Walsh, 939 N.E.2d 389, 397 (Ill. 2010) (quoting 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 110/5).
69. Madiar & Sheahan, supra note 65, at 621 (quoting 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/15).  The
Sandholm appellate court itself argued that “[t]he [CPA] exceeds [traditional] definition[s] by
including the rights to speak, assemble, or otherwise participate in government, and it is not
limited to matters of social or civic concern.”  Sandholm v. Kuecker, 942 N.E.2d 544, 550 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2010).
70. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/10, 30(b).  The Act defines “government” as “a branch, depart-
ment, agency, instrumentality, official, employee, agent, or other person acting under color of
law of the United States, a state, a subdivision of a state, or another public authority including
the electorate.” Id. § 10.  “‘Person’ includes any individual, corporation, association, organiza-
tion, partnership, 2 or more persons having a joint or common interest, or other legal entity.” Id.
Further, a “‘[j]udicial claim’ or ‘claim’ include[s] any lawsuit, cause of action, claim, cross-claim,
counterclaim, or other judicial pleading or filing alleging injury.” Id.  These definitions encom-
pass the widest breadth that one can imagine the words allowing.
71. Id. § 15.
72. Id. § 20(c).
73. See Wright Dev. Grp., 939 N.E.2d at 398.
74. Id. at 400.
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president claiming that the president made defamatory statements to
a newspaper directly following an alderman-sponsored public meet-
ing.75  The trial court had denied the defendant’s special motion be-
cause the statements were made to a reporter, rather than addressed
to the government.76  However, the trial court ultimately dismissed
the suit pursuant to Illinois’s innocent construction rule,77 which re-
quires courts to construe statements innocently if it is reasonable to do
so considering their context.78  The appellate court then dismissed the
defendant’s appeal as moot because “[he] got exactly the relief he
sought (i.e., dismissal of the complaint), albeit on a different basis.”79
The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court that the suit
should be dismissed.80  Nonetheless, the appeal was not moot because
an express public policy ground of the CPA is to provide “attorney’s
fees and costs to prevailing movants,”81 and because the plaintiff’s suit
did generally arise out of defendant’s “petitioning” activities, the law-
suit was a SLAPP and the defendant should receive the protection
and financial benefits of the CPA.82
2. Shoreline Towers Condominium Association v. Gassman83
In Shoreline, a resident sued her condominium association regard-
ing its rule prohibiting her from displaying a religious object in her
doorway.84  The association and its president counterclaimed for har-
assment, intimidation, and defamation, alleging that she provided in-
75. Id. at 390–91.  The condominium association president believed that answering the re-
porter’s follow-up questions after the meeting was “continuing to further participate in what the
purpose of the meeting was” because he was discussing the same topics as those in the alder-
man’s meeting. Id. at 391–92 (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. Id. at 389.
77. See id. at 394–95.
78. Bryson v. News Am. Publications, Inc., 672 N.E.2d 1207, 1215 (Ill. 1996); see also Kolegas
v. Heftel Broad. Corp., 607 N.E.2d 201, 206–08 (Ill. 1992); Chapski v. Copley Press, 442 N.E.2d
195, 196–97 (Ill. 1982).
79. Wright Dev. Grp., 939 N.E.2d at 394–95.
80. Id. at 389.  The trial court denied the defendant’s special motion because the statements
were made to a reporter, rather than addressed to the government. See id.  However, the trial
court ultimately dismissed the suit pursuant to Illinois’s innocent construction rule. See id. at
394–95.  The appellate court then dismissed the defendant’s appeal as moot because “[he] got
exactly the relief he sought (i.e., dismissal of the complaint), albeit on a different basis.” Id.
81. Id. at 397 (citing 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/5 (2012)).
82. The court found that the defendant’s statements to the reporter were constitutionally pro-
tected as being “in furtherance” of his rights because the CPA expressly includes “the electo-
rate” in its definition of “government.” Id. at 397–400 (quoting 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/10,
15).
83. Shoreline Towers Condo. Ass’n v. Gassman, 936 N.E.2d 1198 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
84. Id. at 1201.  The resident filed several lawsuits alleging religious discrimination.  Her suits
were dismissed for lack of substantial evidence and closed pursuant to the condominium associa-
tion’s voluntary revision of its rules. Id. at 1201–02.
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accurate information to a local newspaper, ripped down flyers, and
accused the association president of being a drug dealer, among other
things.85  The resident filed a motion to dismiss and argued that the
whole suit should be dismissed pursuant to the CPA because she was
acting in furtherance of her constitutional rights while attempting to
protect herself from religious discrimination.86  The trial court par-
tially dismissed the association’s complaint pursuant to the CPA, but
did not dismiss the defamation claims relating to the president be-
cause, the court reasoned, “Anti-SLAPP legislation is not intended to
protect those who actually commit torts but to protect those who are
in danger of being sued solely because of their valid attempts to peti-
tion the government.”87  The appellate court distinguished the resi-
dent’s defamatory actions against the president as an individual from
those against the condominium association for its rules restricting her
religious freedom.88   In affirming the trial court, the appellate court
clarified that the condominium association’s defamation claims were
clearly brought against the resident in response to her acts in further-
ance of her constitutional rights and, thus, were protected by the stat-
ute’s broad scope, noting that “the [CPA] . . . protects from liability all
constitutional forms of expression and participation in pursuit of
favorable government action.”89
3.  Sandholm: The Appellate Decision
In Sandholm,90 a former high school basketball coach brought an
action for defamation per se91 against a group of defendants com-
85. Id. at 1203–04.  The defendant also told the building desk clerk that
she had friends on the police force who would be monitoring [the condominium presi-
dent] and his guests for suspicious behavior. . . .  Later, [she] told the desk clerk that
[the condominium president] had a homosexual lover.  She also told the desk clerk that
[the condominium president] was involved in litigation regarding alleged misconduct
with one of his patients.
Id. at 1203.
86. Id. at 1204.
87. Id. at 1204–05 (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. Id. at 1204–07.
89. Shoreline Towers Condo. Ass’n, 936 N.E.2d  at 1207.
90. The appellate court considered this a case of first impression regarding the scope of the
CPA because it did not involve a “typical SLAPP case.” See Sandholm v. Kuecker, 942 N.E.2d
544, 550 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
91. A statement is defamatory if it “tends to harm a person’s reputation to the extent that it
lowers that person in the eyes of the community or deters others from associating with that
person.” Id. (citing Tuite v. Corbitt, 866 N.E.2d 114, 121 (Ill. 2006)).  A statement is defamatory
per se if “its defamatory character is obvious and apparent on its face and injury to the plaintiff’s
reputation may be presumed.” Id. at 558.  Exceptions apply in certain circumstances, including
when the statement is substantially true, when the statement is subject to a qualified privilege—
like the fair report privilege—or absolute privilege, and when the statement is made during
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prised primarily of parents of student-athletes who were dissatisfied
with the coach’s methods and had campaigned to have him removed
from the school’s staff.92  The parents sought the coach’s removal by
approaching the school principal, superintendent, and members of the
school district board.93  When that was ineffective, they made alleg-
edly defamatory statements about the coach online and on the radio,
including that the plaintiff “adversely performed his job, that his
coaching philosophy was to verbally abuse, bully, discourage, and des-
ecrate players, and that plaintiff needed to be fired.”94  The appellate
court affirmed the trial court’s grant of the parents’ CPA special mo-
tion to dismiss, including attorney fees,95 agreeing that the CPA was
“written broadly enough that it applies to [the parents’] statements
made outside the petition and the school board meeting.”96
The appellate court agreed with the trial court’s determination that
the parents had genuinely97 “acted in furtherance of their desire that
legislative proceedings. Id. at 558–59 (citing J. Maki Constr. Co. v. Chi. Reg’l Council of
Carpenters, 882 N.E.2d 1173, 1186 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008); Solaia Tech., LLC v. Specialty Publ’g Co.,
852 N.E.2d 825, 842 (Ill. 2006)).  The Sandholm court declared:
[T]he [CPA] alters existing defamation law by providing a new, qualified privilege for
any defamatory statements communicated in furtherance of one’s right to petition,
speak, assemble, or otherwise participate in government.  The privilege is qualified be-
cause it may be exceeded if the statements are not made with the genuine aim at pro-
curing a favorable government action.
Id. at 559–60.
92. Id. at 551.  On April 23, 2008, the school board removed the plaintiff from his coaching
job, but allowed him to retain his position as the school’s athletic director. Id. at 553.
93. Id. at 551.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 576.
96. Sandholm, 942 N.E.2d at 563.
97. An analysis of genuineness is based on the Noerr–Pennington doctrine. See Sobczak,
supra note 7, at 568–70.  The appellate court in Sandholm found that, based on the legislative
history of the CPA, the legislature intended to adopt the Noerr–Pennington doctrine, which pro-
vides a limit on antitrust liability by protecting companies’ lobbying efforts subject to a “sham
exception.” See Sandholm, 942 N.E.2d at 566–67 (citing E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657 (1965)).  Under City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,—which elaborated on
the  doctrine and was referenced by the CPA’s sponsors during legislative hearings—a person’s
petitioning activities are immunized from suit unless the other party can show that those activi-
ties are a “sham.”  City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991).
When a defendant’s activities are “not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government ac-
tion at all” then it is a “sham.” Id. at 380 (quoting Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head,
Inc., 486 U.S. 496, 500 n.4 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Supreme Court later
created a two-part test to identify “sham” lawsuits: (1) the court must determine whether the
petitioning activity was “objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realis-
tically expect success on the merits,” and (2) if the court finds that the petitioner’s activity was
objectively baseless, the court must analyze “whether the baseless lawsuit conceals ‘an attempt
to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor.’”  Prof’l Real Estate Inves-
tors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 60–61 (1993) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
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the school board remove plaintiff as coach and athletic director” and
held that the Act barred plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety.98  The
court analyzed the parents’ genuineness through the “sham excep-
tion,” which it explained as “encompass[ing] situations in which ‘per-
sons use the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of the
process—as an anticompetitive weapon.’”99  The court determined
that the parents’ petitioning was genuine because, objectively, the par-
ents could have reasonably expected to remove the plaintiff from his
coaching position, which was supported by the fact that their actions
led to their “desired outcome that the school board remove plaintiff as
coach of the basketball team.”100
The court also considered the plaintiff’s argument that the trial
court failed to “strike a balance between the rights of persons to file
lawsuits for injury and the constitutional rights of persons to petition,
speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in govern-
ment.”101  The appellate court concluded that “[t]he legislature pre-
sumably struck the balance by passing the Act itself, and it [was] not
the court’s role to rewrite a statute that appears to lead to unjust re-
sults when interpreted as written.”102  Thus, the appellate court af-
firmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s action.103
III. THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN SANDHOLM
The Illinois Supreme Court overturned the appellate court and held
that the CPA did not bar the plaintiff from bringing a defamation ac-
tion against the parents who campaigned for his removal.104  The
court’s decision limited the scope of the CPA by establishing that “the
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144).  An Illinois appellate court defined the sham standard as “when a defen-
dant petitions the government with no realistic expectation of a favorable result, but merely to
force expense and delay on the other party.”  Stahelin v. Forest Pres. Dist., 877 N.E.2d 1121,
1132 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
98. Sandholm, 942 N.E.2d at 554, 556.  The court acknowledged that
section 15 . . . appeared ambiguous in that it both excluded inquiry as to the subjective
intent or purpose of the acts in furtherance of the moving party’s rights and then in-
cluded inquiry as to the genuine aim of those acts. . . . The gist . . . is that even if a
speaker was motivated by an illegal purpose in petitioning the government, as long as
the actions constituted a genuine effort at petitioning for government action, they were
immune from liability.
Id. at 554.
99. Id. at 567 (quoting Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. at 380).
100. Id. at 568–69.
101. Id. at 557, 563 (quoting 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/5 (2012)).
102. Id. at 570–71.  The appellate court emphasized that “[t]he courts . . . are bound to inter-
pret statutes as written and not to strike balances that the legislature already struck.” Id. at 571.
103. Id. at 576.
104. Sandholm v. Kuecker, 962 N.E.2d 418, 434 (Ill. 2012).
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legislature intended to target only meritless, retaliatory SLAPPs and
did not intend to establish a new absolute or qualified privilege for
defamation.”105  The court began with an analysis of the traditional
SLAPP paradigm, which it asserted involves claims that are, “by defi-
nition, meritless.”106  The court further contended that legislators had
that scenario in mind when they drafted the CPA, specifically section
5, which mentions the chilling effect that SLAPP suits have upon citi-
zens’ petitioning activity.107  After an overview of the statutory lan-
guage, the court stated that its “primary objective is to ascertain and
give effect to the intent of the legislature.”108
The court agreed with the plaintiff’s argument “that the Act is in-
tended to apply only to actions based solely on the defendants’ peti-
tioning activities and does not immunize defamation or other
intentional torts.”109  The Sandholm court looked to the Duracraft
court’s construction of the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute’s “based
on” language, which “exclud[es] motions brought against meritorious
claims with a substantial basis other than or in addition to the peti-
tioning activities implicated.”110  The Sandholm court explained that
its interpretive addition of the word “solely” would rebalance the
right of defendants to petition with the right of plaintiffs to seek re-
dress for injuries,111 which was necessary because “where a plaintiff
files suit genuinely seeking relief for damages for the alleged defama-
tion or intentionally tortious acts of defendants, the lawsuit is not
solely based on defendant’s rights of petition, speech, association, or
participation in government.”112  The court also discussed the CPA’s
105. Id. at 431.
106. Id. at 427 (citing John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problem of
SLAPPs, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 395, 396 (1993)).
107. See id. at 428 (citing 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/5 (2012) (“The threat of SLAPPs signifi-
cantly chills and diminishes citizen participation in government, voluntary public service, and the
exercise of these important constitutional rights.  This abuse of the judicial process can and has
been used as a means of intimidating, harassing, or punishing citizens and organizations for in-
volving themselves in public affairs.”).
108. Id. at 429.  The court went on to describe its statutory construction approach: “The most
reliable indicator of the legislative intent is the language of the statute, which should be given its
plain and ordinary meaning.” Id.
109. Id. at 429–31 (citing Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 943 (Mass.
1998)).
110. Sandholm, 962 N.E.2d at 431 (quoting Duracraft Corp., 691 N.E.2d at 943).
111. See id. at 431.  The court saw a “danger inherent in anti-SLAPP statutes . . . that when
constructed or construed too broadly in protecting the rights of defendants, they may impose a
counteractive chilling effect on prospective plaintiffs’ own rights to seek redress from the courts
for injuries suffered.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Sobczak, supra note 7, at 575).
112. Id. at 430 (emphasis added).
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legislative history, which it believed supported its interpretation that
the Act “was aimed solely at traditional, meritless SLAPPs.”113
The court rejected the defendants’ proposition that the “sham ex-
ception” could sufficiently distinguish SLAPPs from meritorious suits,
finding instead that “[t]he sham exception tests the genuineness of the
defendants’ acts; it says nothing about the merits of the plaintiff’s law-
suit.”114  Thus, the court determined that the defendants did not sat-
isfy their burden of proving that the plaintiff’s complaint was “based
on” their petitioning activity, and it did not need to move on to the
plaintiff’s burden.115  The court found it clear that the plaintiff’s “true
goal” was to seek damages for personal and reputational harm, and he
should survive the special motion to dismiss; however, the Illinois Su-
preme Court was careful to disclaim any opinion as to the merits of
the plaintiff’s claim at that early stage of the litigation.116
IV. ANALYSIS
The broad language in the CPA enabled the Sandholm court to ef-
fectively nullify the purpose of Illinois’s anti-SLAPP statute.  The Cal-
ifornia and Massachusetts statutes’ analysis procedures have led those
states to apply their respective anti-SLAPP statutes within the scope
their legislatures intended.  Though Illinois’s anti-SLAPP statute, as
written, calls only for analysis of the genuineness of defendants’ peti-
tioning, the problems with the court’s new “solely” standard create a
need for analysis of the genuineness of plaintiffs’ claims as well in or-
der to achieve the legislature’s goal of protecting individuals’ right to
speak freely without the threat of litigation.  Such a procedure would
restore some degree of pro-defendant deference to the court’s appli-
cation of the CPA, as the Illinois legislature intended.  A two-sided
genuineness analysis would enable courts to identify both sham peti-
tioning activity and sham suits, which would address the Illinois Su-
preme Court’s concern for preserving the balance between parties’
113. Id. at 432.  The court included statements from bill sponsors Senator Cullerton and Rep-
resentative Franks, in which the legislators provided examples of scenarios that the eventual law
would target. Id.
114. Id. at 432–33.  The court emphasized, “If a plaintiff’s complaint genuinely seeks redress
for damages from defamation or other intentional torts and, thus, does not constitute a SLAPP,
it is irrelevant whether the defendants’ actions were genuinely aimed at procuring favorable
government action, result, or outcome.” Id. at 433 (internal quotation marks omitted).  It is
notable that the court failed to address plaintiff’s emphasis of the portion of the statute that
provides, “regardless of intent or purpose.” See id. at 432–33 (quoting 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/
15 (2012)).
115. Id. at 434.
116. Sandholm, 962 N.E.2d at 434.  As of September 2013, the court had yet to rule on the
merits of the plaintiff’s claims.
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rights and achieving fairness in the litigation process.  The Illinois leg-
islature should add a factual-evaluation process to the CPA, which will
address the abuse that may well follow as a result of the Sandholm
decision.
In holding that defamation or intentional tort claims that genuinely
seek relief cannot be solely based on a defendant’s speech and, thus,
are not subject to CPA special dismissal,117 the court opened a flood-
gate through which future plaintiffs may easily bypass a defendant’s
CPA special motion to dismiss.  Despite the legislature’s instruction to
courts to interpret the CPA “liberally” and to give it its full and in-
tended effect,118 the Illinois Supreme Court read an additional word
into the CPA—“solely”—which greatly restricts the applicability of
the CPA’s special motion to dismiss.119
Similar to the appellate court in Shoreline,120 the Illinois Supreme
Court in Sandholm relied heavily on section 5 of the CPA, which in-
structs courts to “strike a balance between the rights of persons to file
lawsuits for injury and the constitutional rights of persons to peti-
tion.”121  In Shoreline, the court found that only four of ten claims
could survive the special motion to dismiss because those four claims
focused on the defendant’s statements that were personally directed at
the association president.122  The other six claims focused on the de-
fendant’s speech regarding the condominium association’s discrimina-
tory policies and were clearly protected petitioning activity because
the defendant’s objective was the alteration of the policies.123  In con-
trast, the Illinois Supreme Court in Sandholm allowed the plaintiff’s
defamation claim to survive even though the defendants’ allegedly de-
famatory speech was the petitioning activity—the reasons they felt the
plaintiff should be removed from his coaching position—as opposed
to a peripheral attack.124 Shoreline is one example of the judiciary’s
ability to discern between petitioning activity that merits the protec-
tion of the CPA and activity that does not. Sandholm unnecessarily
narrowed the statute.  The Illinois Supreme Court believed that it was
ridding the system of a pro-defendant construction, which constituted
117. Id. at 430 (emphasis added).
118. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/30(b).
119. See Sandholm, 962 N.E.2d at 429–31.
120. See Shoreline Towers Condo. Ass’n v. Gassman, 936 N.E.2d 1198, 1206 (Ill. App. Ct.
2010).
121. Sandholm, 962 N.E.2d at 431 (quoting 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/5).
122. See Shoreline Towers Condo. Ass’n, 936 N.E.2d at 1204–05.
123. Id. at 1204–07; see also supra notes 83–89 and accompanying text.
124. See Sandholm, 962 N.E.2d at 434.
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a “danger inherent in anti-SLAPP statutes,”125 by instituting a new
standard whereby a plaintiff’s suit may survive the CPA special mo-
tion if it has been brought with any grounds besides chilling the defen-
dant’s speech.126  However, that goal is contrary to the CPA’s plain
language, which limits courts’ analysis to the defendant’s petitioning
activity and mandates dismissal if the court finds that activity to be in
furtherance of her constitutional rights, regardless of the merits of
plaintiff’s claims against her for that speech.127
When drafting the CPA, legislators intended for the court to reject a
defendant’s motion only if the plaintiff met her high burden.128  That
interpretation heavily favored defendants because when a court deter-
mined there was “petitioning activity,” which was fairly easy because
the statute defines it broadly,129 the court would conclude that the
claim was “based on” the petitioning activity when it was generally the
subject of the plaintiff’s complaint.130  That deference to the defen-
dant was consistent with the CPA’s overall purpose: “[a] broad grant
of conditional immunity for First Amendment activity.”131
The Illinois Supreme Court, in effect, switched the presumption in
favor of the plaintiff by re-weighting the procedural burdens of the
parties.  Because the court determined that the defendants had not
met their burden to prove that the plaintiff’s suit was “solely” based
on their petitioning activity,132 the burden never shifted to the plaintiff
to provide “clear and convincing evidence” that the CPA immunity
did not apply to the defendants’ actions.133  Under the prior standard
that followed the plain language of the CPA, the defendants would
have had to prove only that the plaintiff’s defamation claim was
125. Id. at 431.
126. See id. at 430; see also Ryan v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 979 N.E.2d 954, 962 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2012); August v. Hanlon, 975 N.E.2d 1234, 1244 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
127. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/15 (2012).
128. See id. § 20; see also Sobczak, supra note 7, at 572.
129. The statute defines “petitioning activity” broadly by immunizing that action “regardless
of intent or purpose” and by broadly defining “government” for the purposes of determining
whether those acts were “genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action, result, or
outcome,” to include even the “electorate.”  735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/10–15; see also Sandholm
v. Kuecker, 942 N.E.2d 544, 569–70 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); Madiar & Sheahan, supra note 65, at
621–22.
130. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/20(c).  “The court shall grant the motion and dismiss the judi-
cial claim unless the court finds that the responding party has produced clear and convincing
evidence that the acts of the moving party are not immunized from, or are not the furtherance of
acts immunized from, liability by this Act.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Hytel Grp., Inc. v.
Butler, 938 N.E.2d 542, 554–55 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
131. Sobczak, supra note 7, at 571.
132. Sandholm v. Kuecker, 962 N.E.2d 418, 434 (Ill. 2012).
133. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/20(c).
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“based on” their petitioning activity to have him removed from his
public school coaching position, “regardless of [their] intent or pur-
pose,” so long as it was in furtherance of their constitutional rights.134
A. Enabling Broad Statutory Protection Through Merits Analysis
The Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Sandholm seemed to be a
reaction to criticism that the Illinois anti-SLAPP statute was overly
broad and “impose[d] a counteractive chilling effect on prospective
plaintiffs’ own rights to seek redress.”135  Specifically, the court cited
the CPA’s lack of “an explicit statement of . . . intent” to “establish a
new, qualified privilege” as its justification for reeling in the scope of
the CPA’s applicability.136
1. The Illinois Supreme Court’s Arbitrary Reliance on and
Misapplication of Massachusetts Caselaw in Sandholm
When the Illinois Supreme Court heightened the defendant’s bur-
den in the first prong of the CPA analysis by including the “solely
based on” test, it relied on an unusual source: Massachusetts caselaw.
The Sandholm court cited the “solely” language in Duracraft,137 which
involved two corporate competitors that the Massachusetts court sus-
pected of utilizing the special motion as “an additional litigation tac-
tic.”138  The corporate setting and other facts specific to the case were
crucial to the Massachusetts court’s decision to deny the special mo-
tion to dismiss.139  Nonetheless, the Massachusetts court acknowl-
edged that other fact scenarios might clearly meet the “solely based
on” test and require the court to move on to the second prong of the
analysis.  The court hypothesized that a “defamation claim, for exam-
ple, can be tested by showing that the defendant’s petitioning activity
134. Id. § 15.
135. Sandholm, 962 N.E.2d at 431 (quoting Sobczak, supra note 7, at 575); cf.
James J. Sipchen et al., Thinking of Filing A Defamation Lawsuit? The Citizens Participation Act
May Make You Think Twice, CBA REC., May 25, 2011, at 52 (“[T]he Illinois courts have taken
an extremely broad view of the Act, and thus, provided defense practitioners with a powerful
weapon to combat lawsuits designed to curtail a defendant’s public activities.”); Madiar & Shea-
han, supra note 65, at 623 (“The plain language of the [CPA] appears, however, to fundamentally
alter existing defamation law by affording a new, absolute privilege for any defamatory state-
ments communicated—maliciously or otherwise—while genuinely aiming to procure favorable
government action, even from the electorate.”).
136. Sandholm, 962 N.E.2d at 432.
137. See id. at 430–31.
138. Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 940–41 (Mass. 1998).
139. See id. at 940–43.
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was devoid of factual or legal support and thus can overcome a pre-
sumption of qualified immunity.”140
The Duracraft court explained that the statute’s “construction of
‘based on’ . . . exclude[s] motions brought against meritorious claims
with a substantial basis other than or in addition to the petitioning
activities implicated.”141  In Duracraft, the other substantial basis was
a nondisclosure agreement, which constituted an entirely separate
ground for the plaintiff’s claim that was unrelated to the employee’s
petitioning rights.142  Whereas in Sandholm, the coach asserted a defa-
mation claim, which the Duracraft court plainly suggested survives the
first prong’s “based on” test and requires an analysis under the second
prong.143  The Duracraft court presumably used defamation as an ex-
ample because it is an obvious situation in which the plaintiff’s claim
stems directly from the defendant’s speech; thus, if that speech is
made in the exercise of her constitutional rights, it should be immu-
nized, regardless of any defamatory content.
The Duracraft court’s defamation hypothetical makes plain its opin-
ion that in a defamation action, a defendant would overcome her ini-
tial burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff’s complaint was solely
based on her petitioning activity.  Confusingly, when the Illinois Su-
preme Court adopted the Massachusetts “solely” standard, relying on
Duracraft, it seemingly ignored that court’s defamation example by
finding that the Sandholm defendants failed to satisfy their burden.
The Illinois Supreme Court’s reliance on Duracraft was inappropriate
not only because Massachusetts’s caselaw is based on a different statu-
tory standard, but also because the Sandholm court misinterpreted
Duracraft’s guidance for defamation cases.
2. A Lesson from California
Given the facial similarity between the Illinois and California anti-
SLAPP statutes, including instructions for liberal construction, Cali-
fornia’s experience should provide guidance for both the Illinois judi-
ciary and legislature.144  Widely considered one of the most expansive
anti-SLAPP statutes in the country,145 the language of the California
140. Id. at 942.
141. Id. at 943.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 942.
144. Compare 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/30(b) (2012) (“This Act shall be construed liber-
ally . . . .”); with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2014) (“[T]his section
shall be construed broadly.”).  But see Sobczak, supra note 7, at 584 (contending that California’s
sweeping statute and experience should be viewed as a “cautionary tale”).
145.  Sobczak, supra note 7, at 581.
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statute is strikingly similar to that of the CPA.  Both statutes define
“petitioning activity” as including all statements that generally relate
to an issue of concern to the government, which includes the electo-
rate.146  The statutes also call for a similar two-pronged analysis proce-
dure.  The first prong of each requires analysis of whether the
defendant is immunized because the suit is based on her petitioning
activity (and, under the California statute, whether that activity con-
cerned an issue of public interest).147  Both procedures then allow the
plaintiff a rebuttal opportunity: Illinois courts require the plaintiff to
provide “clear and convincing evidence” that the immunity does not
apply,148 and California courts assess whether the plaintiff can show a
likelihood of prevailing on the merits of the claim.149
Hecimovich, decided by a California appeals court only a month
after the Illinois Supreme Court’s Sandholm decision, offers a valua-
ble comparison of the application of the two state statutes.150  Both
cases involved parents who petitioned to have coaches removed from
their positions because of the parents’ disagreement with the coaches’
disciplinary methods.151  Unlike Sandholm, the California court
granted the defendants’ special motion to dismiss because it deter-
mined that the facts easily satisfied both prongs of the California
test.152  First, the California court determined that the defendants’ ac-
tivity was immunizable because the “principal thrust” of the plaintiff’s
cause of action was conduct that fell under the statute’s definition of
protected activity.153  Second, the court determined that the plaintiff
could not show a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of the claim
146. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/10–15; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e).
147. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/15; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1), (e).
148. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/20(c).
149. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1).
150. See Hecimovich v. Encinal Sch. Parent Teacher Org., 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 455 (Ct. App.
2012); see also supra notes 36–40, 90–94 and accompanying text.  Specifically, the plaintiff in
Sandholm alleged, “defendants defamed him by making statements that [he] abused children,
did not get along with colleagues, and performed poorly at his job.”  Sandholm v. Kuecker, 962
N.E.2d 418, 433 (Ill. 2012).  In Hecimovich, the specific statements were disputed, but the
coach’s complaint alleged that the parents charged him with “immoral qualities including a disre-
gard for the safety of children that by natural consequence would and have in fact injured [plain-
tiff’s] reputation in the community and his ability to engage in the avocation of his choice.”
Hecimovich, 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 471.
151. Compare Sandholm, 962 N.E.2d at 422–25, with Hecimovich, 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 459.
152. See Hecimovich, 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 469, 476.
153. Id. at 466–67. The statute protects “conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitu-
tional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue
or an issue of public interest.” CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e)(4).
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because he had insufficiently pleaded the essential elements of
defamation.154
The Illinois appellate court’s analysis in Sandholm was very similar
to Hecimovich because it determined that the defendants’ statements
were petitioning activity protected by the CPA.155  Both the California
and Illinois appellate court read their respective anti-SLAPP statutes
to provide that even truly defamatory speech could be protected peti-
tioning activity.  Although both courts determined that the defendants
survived genuineness analysis and that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy
their rebuttal burdens,156 the Illinois Supreme Court in Sandholm
overturned the appellate court’s decision and erroneously determined
that the CPA did not apply because the plaintiff “genuinely” sought
damages, making it “irrelevant” whether the defendants genuinely ac-
ted in furtherance of their constitutional rights.157
The Illinois Supreme Court’s focus on the plaintiff’s genuineness is
a clear departure from the CPA’s plain language, which does not call
for the court’s analysis of that matter.  Ironically, even though the
Hecimovich court granted the special motion and the Sandholm court
eventually denied it, the plain language of the Illinois anti-SLAPP
statute could be viewed as more deferential to defendants than the
California statute.  While the California statute offers plaintiffs the
opportunity to show that their claim could be successful if it were al-
lowed to survive and proceed to trial,158 the Illinois statute requires
plaintiffs to meet the very high standard of “clear and convincing evi-
dence” that the defendants’ actions are not protected by the statute.159
B. Balancing Parties’ Burdens under the Sandholm Standard
The Illinois appellate court in Sandholm complied with the pro-de-
fendant standards codified by the legislature by disposing of the suit
once the requirements of the CPA were met and found a way to har-
monize section 5’s warning to “balance” parties’ rights.160  In response
to the plaintiff’s argument that statements made outside the school
board did not qualify as petitioning activity, the appellate court fo-
cused its analysis on whether the defendants’ acts were petitioning ac-
tivity “genuinely aimed at procuring government action.”161  The
154. Hecimovich, 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 469–71.
155. Sandholm v. Kuecker, 942 N.E.2d 544, 570 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
156. See id.; Hecimovich, 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 467, 469–71.
157. Sandholm v. Kuecker, 962 N.E.2d 418, 433 (Ill. 2012).
158. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1).
159. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/20(c) (2012).
160. See Sandholm, 942 N.E.2d at 570.
161. Id. at 563–64.
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appellate court determined that the legislature intended Illinois courts
to analyze defendants’ “genuineness,”162 which calls for consideration
of both the objective and subjective intent of the defendants’ petition-
ing.163  It found that the Sandholm defendants proved that their peti-
tioning activity was genuine because they objectively achieved their
goal of removing the coach from his position at the school.164  How-
ever, the parents need not have even achieved that result because a
court need only ask whether a defendant could have expected to
achieve a favorable government outcome; only if the answer is nega-
tive must the court proceed to an analysis of whether the defendants
subjectively thought they could achieve that result.165
Under the current CPA, a court need only analyze the genuineness
of the defendant’s conduct.166  Illinois courts have recognized that the
genuineness inquiry originates from established doctrines related to
“sham” litigation.167  Traditionally, “sham” analysis involves a deter-
mination of whether “a reasonable litigant could realistically expect
success on the merits.”168  If a court determines that the litigation is
objectively meritless, it may then examine the plaintiff’s subjective
motive, which is determined by assessing whether the litigant is “indif-
ferent to the outcome on the merits of the suit, brought the suit not-
withstanding that the litigation costs would exceed any potential
recovery, or sued primarily to inflict collateral injuries.”169  Currently,
Illinois courts’ analysis of the plaintiff’s motives in bringing a suit is
much more limited: they assess “(1) the proximity in time between the
protected activity and the filing of the complaint, and (2) whether the
damages requested are reasonably related to the facts alleged in the
complaint and are a ‘good-faith estimate of the extent of the injury
sustained.’”170
162. See id. at 566–67.
163. Id. at 568–69.
164. Id. at 569.
165. Id. at 568–69.
166. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/15 (2012).
167. See Stahelin v. Forest Pres. Dist., 877 N.E.2d 1121, 1131–32 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (discuss-
ing E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961)); cf. United
Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor
Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991); Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,
508 U.S. 49 (1993).
168. See James B. Perrine, Commentary, Defining the “Sham Litigation” Exception to the No-
err–Pennington Antitrust Immunity Doctrine: An Analysis of the Professional Real Estate Inves-
tors v. Columbia Pictures Industries Decision, 46 ALA. L. REV. 815, 829–30 (1995) (citing Prof’l
Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 55–56).
169. Id. at 830.
170. Ryan v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 979 N.E.2d 954, 962–63 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (quot-
ing Hytel Grp., Inc. v. Butler, 938 N.E.2d 542, 556 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)).
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The Illinois Supreme Court, however, did not mention any such
procedure and seemingly felt justified in its unsupported determina-
tion that the plaintiff’s “genuine” pursuit of damages warranted sur-
vival of the CPA special motion.171  The court accurately stated, “The
sham exception [of the CPA] tests the genuineness of the defendants’
acts; it says nothing about the merits of the plaintiff’s lawsuit.”172  The
CPA’s limited application of the sham exception, whereby only the
defendant’s petitioning activity is analyzed, was appropriate under the
prior pro-defendant “based on” standard because courts erred in
favor of protecting those defendants’ First Amendment rights.  How-
ever, given the Illinois Supreme Court’s judicial activism undermining
the CPA’s language, the Illinois legislature must react.
An amendment to the CPA adding a provision to the second-prong,
similar to California’s scrutiny of the merits of the plaintiff’s suit,
would restore some protection for defendants.  Not only would such
an amendment demonstrate the legislature’s intention through the
overt exclusion of the word “solely” in the first prong, but it would
also assist the CPA’s goal of disposing of SLAPP litigation when peti-
tioning defendants are sued for defamation—one of the most common
forms of SLAPP suits173—because Illinois applies a unique doctrine
called the innocent construction rule.174  Illinois is the only state with
the innocent construction rule, which is a “rigorous standard” that fa-
vors defendants accused of defamation.175  Thus, its implementation at
the motion to dismiss phase, as opposed to later in litigation when the
defendant has already incurred plenty of attorney’s fees, could recap-
ture some defendant deference.
171. See Sandholm v. Kuecker, 962 N.E.2d 418, 433 (Ill. 2012).
172. Id. (“It is entirely possible that defendants could spread malicious lies about an individ-
ual while in the course of genuinely petitioning the government for a favorable result.  For in-
stance, in the case at bar, plaintiff alleges that defendants defamed him by making statements
that plaintiff abused children, did not get along with colleagues, and performed poorly at his job.
Assuming these statements constitute actionable defamation, it does not follow that defendants
were not genuinely attempting to achieve a favorable governmental result by pressuring the
school board into firing the plaintiff.  If a plaintiff’s complaint genuinely seeks redress for dam-
ages from defamation or other intentional torts and, thus, does not constitute a SLAPP, it is
irrelevant whether the defendants’ actions were ‘genuinely aimed at procuring favorable govern-
ment action, result, or outcome.’” (footnote omitted)).
173. Tate, supra note 27, at 804–05; see also Sharon J. Arkin, Bringing California’s Anti-
SLAPP Statute Full Circle: To Commercial Speech and Back Again, 31 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3
(2003) (citing Wilcox v. Super. Ct., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 449 (Ct. App. 1994)).
174. See Sipchen et al., supra note 135, at 54 (“The rule requires courts to give statements a
non-defamatory interpretation if that interpretation is reasonable.”).
175. Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 667 N.E.2d 1296, 1302 (Ill. 1996); see also 1 RODNEY A.
SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 4:22 (2d ed. 2013).  See generally infra text accompanying notes
208–213.
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An amendment clarifying the absence of “solely” in the first prong
and requiring plaintiffs to show a likelihood that they could prevail at
trial in the second prong would rectify the court’s error in Sandholm.
It would restore the motion’s application to defamation claims that
are clearly based on a defendant’s speech in furtherance of her consti-
tutional rights.  It would also add a deeper analysis of whether the
plaintiff’s suit would inevitably fail because of the pro-defendant inno-
cent construction rule—or for other reasons such as inadequacy of
pleadings.176  The revised plaintiff’s burden would be to provide clear
and convincing evidence (1) that the defendant’s activity was either
not genuine or not petitioning activity, and (2) that the plaintiff can
prevail at trial.
The amendment would provide a safeguard against the currently
drastic “solely” language only if the Illinois Supreme Court first rec-
ognizes that the statute calls for immunization of genuine petitioning
activity.  If that were established, only when a court determined that a
defendant’s petitioning activity was genuine would it move on to the
analysis of the plaintiff’s suit.  This would create a standard that sup-
ports the overarching policy aims of the statute because it would
thwart plaintiffs from pursuing retaliatory litigation when a court can
recognize that their claims stand little chance to succeed, even if their
suit is not “solely” based on a defendant’s genuine petitioning activity.
Without an amendment that provides such a balancing, it is inevitable
that where prior courts’ analysis focused primarily on defendants’ con-
duct, future courts will merely focus on the plaintiff’s stated grounds
for bringing the suit.  This is a strange turn of events because the origi-
nal purpose of the CPA was to provide a semi-automatic motion to
dismiss that safeguards defendants’ petitioning activity.177  Under the
current Sandholm test, courts need only analyze whether the plaintiff
has brought her suit for any reason other than chilling the defendant’s
speech,178 which is a vague, shallow, and easily met standard.
V. IMPACT
Sophisticated litigants will abuse the Sandholm standard by using
their financial prowess to prolong litigation and chill others’ speech.
An amendment to the second prong that adds a merits analysis would
combat that abuse and potentially restore some pro-defendant defer-
ence, as the legislature intended.
176. See Hecimovich v. Encinal Sch. Parent Teacher Org., 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 455, 471–73 (Ct.
App. 2012).
177. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/5 (2012).
178. See Sandholm v. Kuecker, 962 N.E.2d 418, 430 (Ill. 2012).
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A. The New “Solely” Burden Will Chill Speech
The Illinois Supreme Court subverted the legislature’s intention to
provide a presumption in favor of the defendant by heightening the
defendant’s initial burden.  Plaintiffs will presumably always claim
that they are bringing suit with some other basis besides “chilling” the
defendant’s speech.  This is especially true when the suits are true
SLAPP suits because those plaintiffs’ motive is to give their suit the
appearance of validity in order to prolong litigation.179  Historically,
SLAPP suits have been brought in many forms and under multiple
bases, “including libel, slander, tortious interference with a contract or
a business interest, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and, less
often, . . . violations of the prospective plaintiff’s constitutional rights,
such as due process or equal protection.”180
Thus, although the CPA’s plain language purpose is to protect pri-
vate citizens from expensive litigation, any sophisticated plaintiff may
survive the motion to dismiss by seemingly having more than one ba-
sis for her claim.  The standard may be even easier than having multi-
ple bases because the plaintiff in Sandholm claimed only defamation
per se, presumably based on the defendants’ speech, which was found
to be sufficient to survive the special motion because his “true goal . . .
[was] to seek damages for the personal harm to his reputation.”181
The court found that his claim should survive the special motion be-
cause it did not fall into the traditional SLAPP paradigm,182 which the
court asserted is driven by claims that are “by definition, meritless.”183
However, the court’s analysis was misguided because the language of
the CPA only required the defendant’s petitioning activity to be genu-
ine, which the court expressly disavowed.184  Thus, the CPA has gone
from a stalwart protection for citizens’ petitioning rights to a flimsy
precaution, and it is now difficult to imagine what kind of claim a
court would discern as having only the purpose of chilling a defen-
dant’s speech.
Sandholm has likely left Illinois citizens in an even worse position
than they were in prior to the CPA’s enactment because defendants
who attempt to bring the special motion and lose will be accountable
179. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
180. Sobczak, supra note 7, at 561 (citing Pring, supra note 20, at 8–9 & nn.11–15).
181. Sandholm, 962 N.E.2d at 434.
182. Id. at 434.
183. Id. at 427 (citing Barker, supra note 106, at 396).
184. See id. at 433 (“If a plaintiff’s complaint genuinely seeks redress for damages from defa-
mation or other intentional torts and, thus, does not constitute a SLAPP, it is irrelevant whether
the defendants’ actions were genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action, result,
or outcome.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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for those additional attorney’s fees.185  Alternatively, the failure to
bring the motion for fear of additional attorneys fees will strong-arm
defendants into the expensive discovery process, which the Act in-
tended to avoid.186  These financial pressures will likely result in a set-
tlement for most litigants.  Such legal feuds and their costly
settlements will serve as cautionary tales that chill the speech of other
possible petitioners who would voice their opinions against wealthy
corporate or private entities if not for the financial burden.  Thus, the
only defendants that will likely bring this motion will be those with
deep pockets who seek to prolong litigation against less sophisticated
plaintiffs.
That exact trend was observed in California when the broad lan-
guage of California’s anti-SLAPP statute led some California corpora-
tions to employ the special motion when sued for their commercial
speech.187  The Practicing Law Institute, a nonprofit continuing legal
education organization, amongst others, even held legal seminars ad-
vising corporations “to employ the anti-SLAPP motion as a new liti-
gation weapon by filing it in otherwise ordinary personal injury and
products liability cases.”188  That trend led the California legislature to
clarify the statute’s scope and “fix the abuse.”189  California courts
found that corporate petitioning activities are not chilled in the same
way that individuals’ are and should not receive the benefit that the
anti-SLAPP motion bestows.190  Though a different phenomenon than
that which Illinois will likely experience as a result of Sandholm, it is a
valuable policy lesson.  Both states’ anti-SLAPP statutes seek to pro-
tect common individual citizens, who are by nature of their economic
status vulnerable to judicial manipulation by those who have greater
resources with which to instigate and defend lawsuits.191  When that
pattern was observed in California, before it adopted a new statutory
provision that directly addressed that abuse,192 commentators la-
mented that “[t]he cure ha[d] become the disease—SLAPP motions
[were] . . . just the latest form of abusive litigation.”193
185. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/25 (2012).
186. Id. § 5.
187. Baker, supra note 15, at 413.
188. Id. at 413 n.38.
189. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
190. See Baker, supra note 15, at 419.
191. See S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 2004–2005 GEN. ASSEMB., COMM. ANALYSIS OF S.B.
515, at 6 (Cal. 2003); see also Sobczak, supra note 7, at 564 (citing Braun, supra note 24, at 969
n.13 (“The costs of litigation are tax-deductible for the filers but not for the legal targets.”)).
192. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.17 (West Supp. 2014).
193. Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 714 (Cal. 2002) (Brown, J., dissenting).
2014] SANDHOLM V. KUECKER 1121
B. Merits Analysis Can Restore Balance
It is unclear why the Illinois Supreme Court looked specifically to
Massachusetts’s law when construing the CPA’s new standard in
Sandholm.194  The Sandholm defendants’ activity should have passed
Duracraft’s solely test because it was clearly directed at the “govern-
ment,” under the CPA’s wide definition.195  Regardless, had the court
applied Duracraft correctly, it would have found that the plaintiff’s
claim satisfied the first prong because it was based solely on the de-
fendants’ petitioning activity, and then moved on to a second-prong
analysis.196  Under the second prong of the Massachusetts statute, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that, “(1) the moving party’s exercise of its
right to petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any
arguable basis in law and (2) the moving party’s acts caused actual
injury to the responding party.”197
Because the Illinois Supreme Court borrowed its new language
from Duracraft, it should have read that case in conjunction with
Duracraft’s companion case Baker v. Parsons.198 Baker details how to
proceed with the plaintiff’s burden when the defendant’s “solely” bur-
den is met.199  The Baker court, recalling Duracraft’s similar analysis,
proceeded by weighing the competing interests of each party’s right to
petition in light of the Massachusetts statute’s clear presumption for
dismissal.200  It determined that the plaintiff’s burden requires a show-
ing “by a preponderance of the evidence” that the defendant’s peti-
tioning activity “lacked any reasonable factual support or any
arguable basis in law,” which properly “place[d] the burden on the
194. Sandholm v. Kuecker, 962 N.E.2d 418, 431–32 (Ill. 2012).
195. See Sandholm v. Kuecker, 942 N.E.2d 544, 551–53 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (summarizing the
plaintiff’s claims against various defendants for their allegedly defamatory statements, which
were all directed at the electorate, seemingly in an effort to have the coach removed).  In Shore-
line, the court distinguished the defendant’s actions from those protected by the statute’s broad
scope by noting that the CPA “protects from liability all constitutional forms of expression and
participation in pursuit of favorable government action.”  Shoreline Towers Condo. Ass’n v.
Gassman, 936 N.E.2d 1198, 1207 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).  Thus, even though the defendant’s activi-
ties were flagrant, the statute provided protection so long as they were related to her goal of
rectifying the religious discrimination she experienced at the hands of the plaintiffs. See id.  Sim-
ilarly, the Sandholm defendants may have gone too far in their campaign against the plaintiff,
but they were seemingly always acting in pursuit of having him removed from his position by the
school board. See Sandholm, 942 N.E.2d at 551–53.  Under the prior standard, like that utilized
in Shoreline, the Sandholm defendants would presumably be immunized because they were still
pursuing government action; however, under the current standard, their actions are never even
analyzed because the court does not get to the second prong.
196. See Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 942 (Mass. 1998).
197. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 231 § 59H (2010).
198. Baker v. Parsons, 750 N.E.2d 953 (Mass. 2001).
199. See id. at 960–62.
200. Id. at 961.
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nonmoving party, as the Legislature intended, but without creating an
insurmountable barrier to relief.”201
The Massachusetts court, though aware of the tension that an anti-
SLAPP statute causes by putting two parties’ constitutional rights in
conflict, prioritized the legislature’s intent over its own discretion and
retained the statute’s defendant deference, which the Illinois Supreme
Court failed to preserve.  The Massachusetts second prong provides a
valuable guide for Illinois, considering the Sandholm court’s valid
concern for balancing parties’ rights.  Both California and Massachu-
setts seek to preserve fairness and justice through a second-prong un-
derlying fact analysis: California courts assess the merits of the claim
and Massachusetts courts evaluate the “factual and legal support” for
the defendant’s petitioning.202
Because the Illinois Supreme Court determined that a departure
from the statute was necessary, the aforementioned amendment ad-
ding a factual analysis would also satisfy courts’ concern for fairness
and balance, while allowing the statute to effectively dispose of
SLAPP suits at this early stage.  The current standard under
Sandholm leaves the CPA seemingly defunct and useless for defend-
ants who genuinely require its assistance in eradicating retaliatory
suits.  Granted, installing a factual analysis into the burden shifting
procedure seems contradictory to the CPA’s goal of expediency and
cost saving.203  Despite the additional time and resources that factual
analysis will require, it will inevitably result in a more accurate initial
evaluation of the parties’ actions and, as discussed earlier in Wright,204
such determinations are crucial to make at the special motion stage
because of the CPA’s express public policy to provide attorney’s fees
and costs to prevailing movants.205  Thus, some additional measure is
necessary in order to put petitioners back in their rightful place as the
object of the court’s deferential protection and “to protect and en-
courage public participation in government to the maximum extent
permitted by law.”206
Unlike Baker, though, the Sandholm court ignored the legislature’s
express public policy purpose of protecting individuals’ First Amend-
201. Id.
202. Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West Supp. 2014), with MASS. GEN.
LAWS. ch. 231 § 59H.
203. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/5 (2012) (“It is in the public interest and it is the purpose of
this Act to . . . establish an efficient process for identification and adjudication of SLAPPs . . . .”).
204. See generally supra notes 73–82 and accompanying text.
205. See Wright Dev. Grp., LLC v. Walsh, 939 N.E.2d 389, 395–97 (Ill. 2010) (citing 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 110/5).
206. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/5.
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ment rights and, instead, caused the defendants to incur legal fees,
defeating yet another major purpose of the CPA.207  If the court had
also engaged in a factual analysis component, it would likely have rec-
ognized the impact that the imminent application of the innocent con-
struction rule will have on the outcome of the litigation when it
eventually proceeds to the trial phase.  In California, the court as-
sesses whether the plaintiff has satisfied her rebuttal burden to “estab-
lish[] that there is a probability that [she] will prevail on the claim.”208
The addition of a factual inquiry procedure into the court’s special
motion analysis, which would include an innocent construction rule
evaluation in defamation cases, is appropriate because it could
achieve a purpose very similar to that of the CPA by supporting “the
constitutional interests of free speech and free press and en-
courag[ing] the robust discussion of daily affairs.”209
One post-Sandholm court demonstrated the problem detailed in
this Note by admitting, “[t]he fact that the defendants’ activities are
the kind the Act is intended to protect does not mean that [the plain-
tiff’s] lawsuit is subject to dismissal as a SLAPP lawsuit.”210  Rather
than abiding by the CPA’s plain language, post-Sandholm courts have
interpreted the CPA standard as requiring defendants to present evi-
dence that the plaintiff’s claim is solely based on their activity by prov-
ing that the plaintiff’s claim lacks any merit and has a retaliatory
intent, in addition to their burden to show that their petitioning was
genuine.211  The Sandholm standard has been insurmountable since its
enactment.212  In another recent case, the court rejected the special
motion brought by investigative reporter defendants, who, by nature
of their profession, were likely even better equipped than the average
defendant to find evidence demonstrating that their activity was
aimed at important governmental action and that their reportage was
based on verifiable evidence.213
207. Id.
208. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West Supp. 2014).
209. Chapski v. Copley Press, 442 N.E.2d 195, 198 (Ill. 1982) (West Supp. 2014).
210. Chi. Reg’l Council of Carpenters v. Jursich, 986 N.E.2d 197, 201 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
211. See, e.g., id.; Ryan v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 979 N.E.2d 954, 963 (Ill. App. Ct.
2012).  In Ryan, the defendants’ special motion was denied despite evidence of the plaintiff’s
retaliatory intent because “that alone does not make the lawsuit a SLAPP because a SLAPP is
also ‘by definition, meritless.’” Id. (quoting Sandholm v. Kuecker, 962 N.E.2d 418, 427 (Ill.
2012)).
212. See Capeheart v. Terrell, 996 N.E.2d 257, 261 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013); Garrido v. Arena, 993
N.E.2d 488, 496, 501 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013); Kresta v. Zajewski, 2013 IL App (1st) 110772-U, ¶ 18;
Jursich, 986 N.E.2d at 201, 203–04; Ryan, 979 N.E.2d at 962–65; August v. Hanlon, 975 N.E.2d
1234, 1245 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
213. See Ryan, 979 N.E.2d at 956–57, 965.
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If future courts undertake a factual analysis to determine if a defen-
dant’s statements are even actionable, defendants would be equipped
with another tool for receiving expedited judicial review and their at-
torney’s fees and expenses.  This could provide the relief that defend-
ants “who have been victimized by meritless, retaliatory SLAPP
lawsuits” deserve.214
VI. CONCLUSION
The Illinois appellate court in Sandholm was correct when it stated,
“[t]he legislature presumably struck the balance by passing the Act
itself, and it is not the court’s role to rewrite a statute that appears to
lead to unjust results when interpreted as written.”215  The Illinois Su-
preme Court in Sandholm disregarded the appellate court’s reasoning
and threw off the delicate balance established by legislators.  The
court should have recognized that the legislature had done its job
when it wrote the CPA and prioritized defendants’ First Amendment
rights over those of the plaintiff to bring a suit, in order to address the
“disturbing” SLAPP trend.216  Perhaps the legislature made it the stat-
ute’s primary procedure to assess the defendant’s genuineness pre-
cisely because SLAPPs are so difficult to identify.217
The Illinois Supreme Court overstepped its bounds by effectively
amending the statute because it determined that that preferential
treatment was somehow unfair, but it is not the court’s role to alter
legislation.  The result is a confusing standard that can only be fixed
by, either (1) an entire reversal of the Sandholm decision which re-
stores the CPA standards back to the written language of the statute,
or (2) an amendment to the CPA clarifying whether a suit need be
“solely based on” the defendants’ speech, in addition to a factual eval-
uation of the merits of the suit, as detailed in this Note.  Before the
Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Sandholm, critics warned that
courts would have to fashion creative solutions to the statute’s overly
broad and vague language;218 however, a solution that disenfranchises
214. Wright Dev. Grp., LLC v. Walsh, 939 N.E.2d 389, 396 (Ill. 2010).
215. Sandholm v. Kuecker, 942 N.E.2d 544, 570–71 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
216. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/5 (2012).
217. See Ryan, 979 N.E.2d at 960 (remarking on “the most intractable problem associated
with SLAPPs: they are very hard to distinguish from normal lawsuits”).
218. See, e.g., Sobczak, supra note 7, at 591–92.
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an entire class of individuals because they cannot afford to defend
their First Amendment rights is not a solution, it is a gag order.
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